The RCO Job consisting of two switchmen, where humping cars out of a
receiving yard track. The receiving yard has 10 tracks, and all 10 of
those tracks work their way into a single hump lead, so that any train,
can be humped into the bowl side of the yard for classification from any
receiving yard track. The switch job was using a switch engine equipped
with Remote Control Technology.
The RCO job finished their cut of cars they were humping out of the
receiving yard. During this procedure the RCO crew had a "Zone"
established, which is the BNSF's method of protecting the RCO
Locomotive, when the crew has to make a move away from them, with no one
on the point. In essence, this is the only way that an RCO switch crew
at Barstow, Calif can pull or shove blind.
When the switch crew finished humping cars, they were instructed to
shove over the hump crest and couple up a track of rail cars in the
bowl, and pull it back over the hump crest for rehumping purposes. When
they were given these instructions by not 1, but 2 BNSF Trainmasters
operating this side of the Barstow yard, they still had their zone
protection. The RCO crew never gave their zone protection back to BNSF
management and went down to perform their next move. Under current RCO
rules, a zone can only be given back by the crew that requested it.
However, in this instance the 2 BNSF Trainmasters, wanted to depart a
priority BNSF Z train with lots of UPS on it. So the trainmaster went
into the computer system, took the "Zone" protection back from the RCO
crew and told the mainline crew on the Z train to depart Barstow on
signal indication. The problem here was the trainmaster did not have the
authority by the rules to pull that zone protection back from the RCO
crew, and even though he did, he nor the other trainmaster never told
the RCO crew via radio that they had taken their protection back. So as
the UPS-Z train is leaving the receiving yard, the RCO switch crew is
pulling a cut of cars up the hump crest in full throttle 8, with both of
them at the rear end of the move, and not on the head end, as they still
think they have zone protection. As the RCO engine comes up over the
crest and starts back into the receiving yard tracks, they slam right
into the side of that UPS- Z train leaving the Barstow yard.
Upon investigation by BLE sources, the Terminal Supt, did not have the
RCO switch crew or the mainline train crew random drug tested, nor did
he get written statements from them -- which is very unusual as all
on-rail related accidents in the past have required a probable cause
drug test and written statements, even if the derailment or accident was
not the fault of the train crew. However, he did test the 2 trainmasters
and took statements from them. The trainmasters took full responsibility
for the accident, as they took the crews protection back without
authority and didn't tell them, they had done that.
In the derailment, it derailed 5 cars, several UPS trailers were damaged
and the Terminal Supt. is putting damage at $19,800.00.
As a side note, Barstow's BNSF rail yard, has one of the highest on hand
car load inventory of loaded Liquid Protroleum Gas tank cars, west of
the Mississippi River. Had this RCO switch crew rammed into the side of
one of these LPG trains, the result would have been devastating not just
to the BNSF, but to the City of Barstow, and it's residents. Our
inventory of railcars at anyone time in Barstow can go as high as 3,000
railcars, with a good majority of them being hazardous materials.
