As a result of union pressure, management and government regulators have agreed that frontline Union Pacific Railroad managers will now be accountable for their actions and will face penalties for ordering workers to violate safety regulations.
On July 1, the new "Managerial Conduct--Supplemental Review Process" was put into effect on the Union Pacific Railroad.
"Officials will now be held accountable for their actions, just as the Locomotive Engineers have always been held accountable for theirs," said BLE First Vice-President James L. "Jim" McCoy.
McCoy, along with Division 193 (Gretna, La.) Local Chairman Gary Perrien, represented the BLE on the SACP Cultural Work Group Committee.
"Brother Perrien devoted a remarkable amount of time and effort into this program," First Vice-President McCoy said. "The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers owe him a debt of gratitude, and I personally thank him for his efforts."
The Safety Assurance and Compliance Program -- or SACP -- was implemented in 1997 following a safety "meltdown" on UP that resulted in 11 deaths in the first eight months of 1997.
"As far as I know, this policy is the first of its kind and up
until now, is unheard of in the railroad industry," McCoy said. "BLE
Locomotive Engineers on the UP will soon reap the harvest of the hard work
of the SACP Cultural Work Group Committee."
Some of the major points in the new policy are as follows:
1. Provides for a quarterly review of the discipline process that includes both labor and management reaching all the way to the Vice Presidents' level.
2. Mangers will be held accountable if they violate, or issue instructions to violate, any rules, policies or state or federal regulations governing the rail industry.
3. Includes an appeal process that goes all the way to top management if labor is dissatisfied with the handling of any issue under the policy.
The level of discipline for managers will be determined by Union Pacific, and includes informal conferencing, formal conferencing, training and education, suspension without pay, and termination of employment.
"Employees who report, testify, or participate in an investigation of any alleged violation of a managerial conduct policy will not be disciplined or subject to any retaliation for this protected activity," the policy states. "No employee will be disciplined, discriminated against or harassed as the result of their decision to empower themselves regarding safety issues that directly compromise personal safety... The harassment or intimidation of anyone filing a report of a violation of a managerial conduct policy will not be tolerated."
There are four steps involved in the reporting of violations and processing of discipline. They are as follows, according to policy:
"Step 1: Any alleged acts in violation of a managerial conduct policy may be reported to the Superintendent or Department head. (Such reports may be made through the employee's Labor Representative.) Labor Representatives receiving such reports will be responsible to research the facts and determine whether the facts warrant forwarding to the Superintendent for further handling.
"Step 2: Upon receiving such reports, the Superintendent will promptly conduct a thorough internal investigation, interview all involved parties, witnesses and gather all pertinent facts. If warranted, the Superintendent will take appropriate disciplinary action. Repeat offenses, when appropriate, will be handled in a progressive, escalating manner.
"Step 3: The person filing the report will be notified of the results of the investigation they initiated within 30 days of the report having been received. Notification will include a written response acknowledging receipt of the initial complaint, advising determinations made and attesting what corrective action, if any, was assessed in accordance with these guidelines.
"Step 4: When disciplinary action is assessed, a notation describing the incident and any corrective action taken will be placed into the manager's personal record and reflected in the manager's next annual performance review and evaluation."
IN THE LINE OF DUTY
Locomotive Engineers W.D. "Don" Blain and Kevin R. Lihou of BLE Division 747 (Mimico, Ont.), who were killed in a VIA Rail accident in Thamesville, Ontario on April 23, 1999, have been nominated posthumously for the second highest award for extreme bravery given by the country of Canada -- the Star of Courage.
These two brave engineers have been nominated for the "Star of Courage" because of their heroism and bravery on that day. They averted greater disaster seconds before the derailment by simultaneously working the throttle and the brake to protect their passengers while warning an oncoming passenger train to stop before it collided with the derailed rail cars.
Investigators have blamed an improperly positioned switch for causing the derailment of the passenger train. Most passengers only walked away with minor cuts and bruises thanks to the actions of Blain and Lihou, although approximately 100 were taken to area hospitals for exams following the derailment.
Blain and Lihou have been nominated for this award by Colwyn G. Benyon, a former brakeman and conductor on a Canadian shortline. Benyon had never met either engineer, but was so moved by their brave act that he was compelled to nominate them. Benyon said that what happened on that day was an extraordinary act of bravery.
"Both men showed extraordinary devotion to duty in a vain attempt to stop their train while at the same time warning an oncoming train to stop. This heroic action undoubtedly saved the lives of scores of helpless passengers on both trains if a second collision had occurred," said Benyon. "It is interesting to note that most acts of bravery involve a choice to be made by the hero in a tragedy. Don Blain and Kevin Lihou were denied the luxury of choice and, knowing their fate, did what they had to do."
The Governor General of Canada, the Queen's representative, has responded to Benyon's appeal. Benyon reports that his application will be reviewed and finalized once an inquest has been performed.
"I am spurred on by bold acts of bravery, in particular those who act spontaneously without regard for their own safety," said Benyon.
The National Transportation Safety Board has issued its ruling regarding the March 25, 1998 accident involving a southbound Norfolk Southern train going to Fort Wayne, Ind. and an eastbound Conrail train heading to Columbus, Ohio.
A collision occurred where the Norfolk Southern Huntingtion District and the Conrail Chicago main lines cross at grade at the east end of the town of Butler, Ind.
Both locomotives and five cars from the Norfolk Southern train derailed,
and three cars from the Conrail train, two with multiple stacked platforms,
derailed. The Norfolk Southern conductor was killed; the engineer and student
engineer sustained minor injuries. The two Conrail crewmembers were not
injured.
The BLE Safety Task Force determined that running the train in the long nose forward position may have contributed to the accident. In the weeks following the fatality, the BLE petitioned the Federal Railroad Administration to adopt a new safety requirement eliminating the use of locomotives in the long-nose forward position.
The NTSB determined that the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the conductor and engineer of the Norfolk Southern train to comply with operating rules. Specifically, the NTSB ruled that they failed to observe and confirm the signal aspects and they failed to continuously and directly supervise the student engineer.
Contributing to the accident was Norfolk Southern's failure to ensure that its locomotive engineer training program provided effective and timely training, oversight, and feedback to ensure that its students were adequately prepared for operational situations.
The NTSB suggests that Norfolk Southern and all carriers institute a program similar to crew resource management in the airline industry and bridge resource management in the marine community.
The safety board also issued a recommendation directed to the BLE. The NTSB recommendation that the BLE, in cooperation with FRA, Class 1 railroads, American Shortline and Regional Railroad Association and the UTU, work together and jointly develop a new program of train crew resource management (TCRM) training.
The TCRM should address crew member proficiency, situational awareness, effective communication and teamwork, and strategies for appropriately challenging and questioning authority.
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