BLE Focus

Fall/Winter 2003
Volume 110 - No. 3 & 4

BLE Focus

An Examination of Positive Train Control

For more than 10 years, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers has strongly endorsed the concept of positive train separation. Several times during the past decade, the BLE petitioned the Federal Railroad Administration for implementation of this technology.

This interest has been the cornerstone of BLE participation in the Positive Train Control RSAC process. Over the past six years of meetings associated with the development of the PTC regulation, it has become apparent that it is a complex area for regulation.

What is PTC?

Positive Train Control systems may use Global Positioning Satellites, train systems and signals, among other means, to keep a safe distance between trains operating on the same lines. The definition of PTC is, itself, controversial and subject to the perspective of the person who uses the term:

to a signal maintainer it is a part of the signal system that includes automatic train control;
to locomotive engineers and conductors it is a safety backup with a form of Cab Signal with Automatic Train Stop;
to the railroads it is a means to achieve more control over the operation of the system;
to high-tech suppliers it is a concept waiting for a product;
to the FRA it is a potential way to increase both safety and efficiency in the industry;
to the passenger rail industry and the proponents of high-speed rail it is a means to gain access to the general railroad system track infrastructure without compromising safety; and
to the science and technology communities it is both a challenge and a mystery.

While PTC is commonly thought of as collision avoidance system, it actually does far more. The theory behind PTC is that it can provide for positive train separation and civil speed enforcement, while at the same time providing protection for roadway workers.

Why is PTC needed?

The technology has been on the National Transportation Safety Board's "Most Wanted" list for many years. Over the last three decades, the Safety Board has investigated a long list of collision accidents in which a positive train control system that incorporated collision avoidance could have prevented train collisions. Since the Bryan, Ohio, accident on January 17, 1999, the Safety Board has investigated 30 collision accidents they claim may have been prevented by PTC systems. In the Bryan accident, the Safety Board noted that PTC is especially important where passenger and freight trains operate on the same track. Since last year, the Safety Board has investigated eight train collision accidents including one in Placentia, California, on April 23, 2002, where a Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Railroad freight train collided head-on with a Metrolink commuter train. This segment of railroad had a three aspect train control system which offered a single warning signal to the locomotive crew.

While several railroads have taken action to implement PTC technology, the NTSB feels that these efforts have been inadequate.

Why hasn't PTC been more widely implemented?

While the railroads jump into some new technology head-long, they have been reluctant to embrace PTC because of the costs involved. The slow pace of implementation has been criticized by the NTSB.

The FRA's rulemaking on microprocessor based train control has been slow to develop and, some would suggest, caused the delay in deployment of some projects. The FRA wants the systems to be interoperable and no railroad has stepped forward to pay the costs of developing such a system. The components involved must all be standardized in order to ensure interoperablity, and additional redundancies for safety and reliability such as location systems must be established.

On March 27, 2002, the FRA responded that it had taken steps in achieving the proper atmosphere in the rail industry to allow for the development and implementation of PTC. One of these steps was the publication on August 10, 2001, in the Federal Register, of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) entitled "Standards for Development and Use of Processor-Based Signal and Train Control Systems." The RSAC working group has essentially completed its to work on resolving issues regarding compliance with the performance standards and FRA is moving the regulation through the necessary channels. Once the final rule is issued (the FRA predicts about 6 months), it will provide the framework for the performance standard for safety-critical functions to be used in PTC systems.

Another step to facilitate development and implementation of PTC is the Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) Network that is now operational on single-station coverage over about 80-85 percent of the land area of the continental United States. NDGPS provides one- to two-meter position accuracy to receivers capable of receiving the differential correction signal. The FRA has a lead role as the sponsoring agency within DOT to complete dual (redundant) coverage of the entire continental United States.

Congress authorized the Secretary of Transportation to establish, operate, and manage the dual coverage NDGPS service in Section 346 of Public Law 105-66, enacted on October 27, 1997. Along with this authorization, Congress provided FY 1998 appropriations for capital expenses.

Presently, 26 of 74 dual coverage NDGPS sites are up and running. This year's budget included $6 million for dual coverage NDGPS: $2.3 million for capital improvements and $3.7 million for operation and maintenance. There is $7 million in FRA's 2004 budget. At current projected funding, the U.S. Coast Guard Navigation Center estimates the remaining 48 sites will be completed by 2014. The FRA and Coast Guard estimate that another $35 million in capital funding is needed to complete this project. The FRA stated it was taking every action within its program authority and available budget authorities to advance the development of technology that will achieve PTS and related safety functions, which together are referred to as PTC.

All of these actions by governmental agencies are steps towards the implementation of PTC in the U.S.

The BLE's view

The BLE supports the use of PTC - with some conditions - because it can save both the lives of train crew members and give engineers an opportunity to remain actively engaged in the operation of the train.

It is the BLE view that PTC must have the following characteristics in order to succeed and be embraced by locomotive engineers:

the technology that is developed must never be less safe than the system it replaces;
the operating crew must be first in the loop for train control;
maintenance of a locomotive engineer's train-handling skills is an absolute requirement under any system, because systems will periodically fail and complete manual operations using traditional train handling will be required; and
the PTC's human-machine interface must be designed as a human-centered system.

The key issue for the BLE is that the system must not take away any of the duties of locomotive engineers and trainmen. The BLE is first and foremost concerned with protecting the lives of its members. PTC can serve as a tool to make sure that locomotive engineers and trainmen get home alive. However, if the technology is improperly deployed the BLE fears that it could distract locomotive engineers and interfere with their vigilance, endangering both the train and its lading, and persons who may access the right of way.

Locomotive engineers have been using some form train control technology since 1926 and the BLE is hopeful that any system that is implemented is as reliable as those which have been in place for years.

The technology has already been introduced on several railroads around the country, including Amtrak, New Jersey Transit, Alaska Railroad, BNSF, CSX and Norfolk Southern. Locomotive Engineers have provided their expertise on these projects in order to make the systems as effective and safe as possible.

Continued on Page 4

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