 |
 |
 |
| Return to Index | Go back to Page 2 | Continue
on to page 4 of 5 |
Conflict at Coal
River Collieries:
The UMWA verses the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers...
Page 3 of 5
When Lewis returned from Europe in June, he and Stone agreed that John C. Lewis of the Iowa State Federation of Labor would serve as mediator in the dispute. John C. Lewis visited CRC, surveyed the situation and ordered John L. Lewis and Warren Stone to call a joint conference of three representatives from each side. (27) Meeting in Chicago on July 6, 1923, the participants fashioned an agreement acceptable to officials of both parties and the miners returned to work. The agreement established an elaborate grievance system whereby problems unresolved locally were to be referred to Stone and John L. Lewis for resolution. The parties also agreed that the check-off and wage issues would be settled in a new contract to be negotiated between the CRC and the UMWA before April 1, 1924.(28)
By the end of March 1924, a new agreement still had not been negotiated between the CRC and the UMWA, although other events in the coal industry during the winter of 1924 made a contract with the CRC all the more important to the UMWA. In February 1924, the UMWA and coal operators in the Central Competitive Field (western Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois) negotiated a three-year contract known as the Jacksonville Agreement. The CRC refused to accept the terms of the Jacksonville Agreement, and announced to stunned UMWA officials that the company intended to cut wages.(29) Without a new contract, and trying desperately to maintain the viability of the Jacksonville Agreement, the UMWA again called a strike at the CRC mines. Stone tried to deflect the blame for the strike to the UMWA, claiming the miners refused to negotiate after the April deadline had passed, forcing the CRC to shut down the mines.(30)
Again mediator John C. Lewis met with Stone,
but was unsuccessful in persuading the Chief Engineer to change
his policy. Stone and the CRC used the on-going labor strife in
the West Virginia coalfields as leverage against the UMWA. During
a meeting with CRC officials in August, Percy Tetlow was informed
that "no agreement would be made by your company unless the
UMWA reps could get other coal operators in that district to
agree to make a similar settlement." With the failure of the
August meeting, John L. Lewis chastised Stone for using tactics
similar to those of the vehemently non-union Kanawha Coal
Operators' Association of southern West Virginia. While
acknowledging that the CRC was not a member of the KCOA, and was
not evicting striking miners, Lewis charged that the CRC
nevertheless was following the Kanawha Operators' lead. Such
action, Lewis informed Stone, "is an intolerable position
for a coal company whose stock is largely owned and whose affairs
are directed by union men to occupy."
Stone's reply to Lewis provides insight into the BLE leader's union philosophy and his motivation for taking this seemingly paradoxical position. Blaming the UMWA's failure to negotiate after the April 1 deadline as the reason for closing the mines, Stone claimed that if the CRC accepted the terms of the Jacksonville Agreement, the non-union mines would undersell CRC. The Chief Engineer reminded Lewis that the striking miners continued to live in company houses rent free and receive credit at the company store. Stone accused Lewis of laboring under the erroneous impression that CRC operated "wholly and solely for the benefit of your organization." Quite the contrary, he declared, "the members of the BLE, who have invested over $3,000,000.00 in these properties, are entitled to some return on their investment." Stone was convinced that non-union mines in the Kanawha field were underpricing the CRC, and "if it comes to the point that we have to pay 13 cents more a ton than we can sell the coal for after its loaded on the cars, without considering any return for our investment, and without taking care of our overhead, we are up against a serious problem, and I think you must realize it."(32)
In his response, Lewis reminded Stone that wage rates were set by the UMWA convention, and that he was not empowered to "deviate therefrom at the pleasure of the CRC any more than at the request of other coal companies which have made similar demands." In Lewis's view, the problems of competition confronting CRC were the result of poor management and inefficient production, a combination which "forever confronts one who elects to become a coal operator." The crux of the matter was clear and simple to Lewis: would CRC sign an agreement along the lines of the Jacksonville Agreement or not? Lewis put the issue to Stone in blunt terms: "Will you settle or will you fight?"(33) The Chief Engineer did not respond to the UMWA President's challenge.
This exchange of letters between Stone and Lewis illuminates the different principles and goals of the two union officials. Of course, Stone was correct in his assertion that non-union mines would undersell the CRC mines if they charged a higher price per ton for coal. John L. Lewis also recognized the ability of non-union operators to undersell union mines, and for this reason the UMWA sought to organize entire fields, and ultimately the entire coal industry. Therefore, as long as non-union operations undersold coal from union mines, the UMWA and non-union coal operators would be in direct conflict.
During this flurry of correspondence between Lewis and Stone, the CRC controversy gained a wider audience. With neither a reply from Stone nor an effort from the BLE to negotiate the issue, Lewis and the UMWA began to disseminate information about the controversy to build pressure within the union movement against the BLE and its Chief Engineer. A pamphlet containing the correspondence between the UMWA and Stone was printed and distributed to UMWA members and other labor organizations. The UMWA partially succeeded in its effort to create public pressure against the BLE. The West Virginia State Federation of Labor passed a resolution supporting the UMWA and sent a telegram to Stone urging him to negotiate. (34) Many UMWA locals passed resolutions and published circulars denouncing Stone and CRC. The UMWA gained a considerable public relations advantage when members of its Local 5597, who worked in the CRC mines, issued a statement specifically refuting many of Stone's assertions. They charged that CRC twice had come to the miners with proposals offering much lower wages than were provided by the Jacksonville Agreement. Furthermore, these CRC miners contended the company's claim of extending credit at company stores was a pure fabrication. "As far as we know," the miners declared, "the company has not contributed one cent toward the relief of any of our members on strike, or their families." In fact, when several miners performed some necessary construction work on the mine, the "company held their wages or the principle part of their wages, for house rent, not leaving as much as ten cents for some of the men to draw on pay day."(35)
During the fall of 1924, the CRC began to evict striking miners and import strikebreakers to reopen two of the four CRC mines. An agency for distributing and selling CRC coal was established in Cleveland, Ohio. Rumors of gun thugs and private mine guards hired by the CRC circulated among the miners further heightening the tension.(36) These and related events received extensive coverage in the "United Mine Workers Journal" during the fall and winter of 1924.
The BLE countered the UMWA maneuvers with propaganda of its own. Stone and the BLE not only defended their actions, but also questioned the motives behind the high-profile UMWA propaganda campaign. Since 1924 was a presidential election year, and Stone supported the third-party candidacy of Robert LaFollette, whereas Lewis backed Republican candidate Calvin Coolidge, Stone and other BLE officials were convinced that the UMWA attacks on the CRC were politically motivated. An article in the "New York Times" quoted a Republican party official who claimed the CRC controversy had hurt the LaFollette candidacy. (37) In his monthly "President's Page" in the "Locomotive Engineers Journal", Stone aired his suspicions regarding the CRC strike:
"We are wondering who paid for the voluminous printing of this propaganda that is being scattered broadcast over the country. We are wondering if the Republican party, which has all kinds of money to spend, is not perhaps back of it, and we are also wondering if there is not the vague probability of a cabinet position being held up as a possible reward for services well done."(38)
---------- BIBLIOGRAPHY ----------
27. "Correspondence," 20-21. back to text
28. "New York Times", 7 July 1923; Maier Fox, "United We Stand: The United Mine Workers of America, 1890-1990" (Washington, D. C.: United Mine Workers of America, 1990), 258; "The Locomotive Engineers Journal" 57(August 1923): 625. back to text
29. "UMWJ", 1 October 1924; "Correspondence," 23. back to text
30. "UMWJ", 15 November 1924. back to text
31. "Correspondence," 23, 24-25. back to text
32. "Ibid"., 25-28. back to text
33. "Ibid"., 28-30. back to text
34. West Virginia State Federation of Labor, "Proceedings" (September 1924): 153. While agreeing to promote the UMWA's cause, one state delegate saw futility in trying to urge Stone to negotiate: "I want to say to this convention that if they spend 25 cents for a telegram it is just 25 cents wasted to send a message to Warren S. Stone." "Ibid"., 153. back to text
35. "UMWJ", 25 October 1924.back to text
36. "Ibid"., 1 November 1924. back to text
37. "New York Times", 25 October 1924. back to text
38. "The Locomotive Engineers Journal" 58(October 1924): 730. back to text